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The Absolute and the Relative  
in Lukács and Simmel 
1. Lukács and Simmel, a Century Later
As the once-bitter disputes within and between 
20th-century Marxist theory have receded in-
to the gallery of historical images of spirit, the 
distance of time has allowed us to see beyond 
the shallow and often uncharitable reception of 
Lukács’s work.1 Indeed, his philosophy has been 
brought back to life, although not necessarily as 
a unitary whole or even a succession of coherent 
positions. Rather, as readers have discovered 
new conceptual structures, aporias, occluded 
connections and historical meanings, Lukács’s 
life work – via the mediation of sensitive and 
thoroughgoing scholarship – has proven capable 
of generating new truth.
The most significant contributions – by 
Andrew Feenberg, Konstantinos Kavoulakos 
and Richard Westerman – have read Lukács’s 
pre-Marxist and 1920s works in light of his con-
temporary neo-Kantian philosophical influences 
in order to recover his own philosophy of praxis, 
1 For a critical resumé of the 20th-century reception of Lukács, 
see López: Lukács, pp. 1–46.
This chapter builds on the 
author’s earlier Hegelian 
critique of Lukács’s 
philosophy of praxis by 
construing a conceptual 
dialogue between Lukács 
and his one-time mentor, 
Georg Simmel. It is argued 
that Lukács’s philosophy 
in the 1920s was partially 
formed as a metacritique 
of Simmel’s absolute 
relativism, as expressed 
in The Philosophy of 
Money. However, Lukács’s 
alternative generates a 
conceptual mythology 
that can be diagnosed 
in Simmelian terms and 
sublated by the philosophy 
of life outlined in The View 
of Life. By situating it in the 
present, this may de-reify 
Lukács’s concept of praxis, 
allowing it to satisfy its 
ethical and rational duty.
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of course articulated in the manner they find most coherent.2 My own work 
– primarily Lukács: Praxis and the Absolute – has taken a different path by 
immanently reconstructing the conceptual structure of Lukács’s philosophy 
of praxis, to radicalise his Hegelian inheritance. In this manner, I identified 
what I regard to be the central aporia (or, in his own language, conceptual 
mythology) in Lukács’s 1920s work. By driving his concept of praxis to 
its limit, I claim to have effected an overcoming of Lukács, in which the 
one-sided truth of his implicitly speculative philosophy can be preserved 
only by a conscious shift to the standpoint of speculative (which is to say, 
Hegelian) philosophy proper.3
This chapter extends upon my earlier argument by way of Lukács’s 
one-time mentor, Georg Simmel. Lukács’s debt to the neo-Kantian social 
theorist and philosopher has not been explored in anywhere near the same 
detail as Lukács’s debt to Marx, Hegel or to other neo-Kantians. Although 
Simmel’s influence is generally noted in passing, critics commonly restrict 
their comments to a brief summary of Simmel’s understanding of the 
»forms of objectification« and Lukács’s critique thereof, which placed the 
commodity, understood in Marxian terms, at the centre of the social to-
tality, instead of money or other heuristics.4 This is no doubt partly due to 
Lukács’s own fairly hostile evaluation of Simmel and perhaps also because 
Simmel has generally been received as a sociologist, and is rarely considered 
a philosopher in his own right.
This contribution cannot rectify this omission wholly. Instead, I will 
construe a conceptual dialogue between Lukács and Simmel, in order to 
demonstrate that the deepest philosophical problems Lukács considered in 
History and Class Consiousness were framed in partial opposition to what he 
viewed as the antinomic and contemplative meaning of Simmel’s thought. 
My method will not be philological: investigating the lineage of a given term 
or problematic is not the royal road to conceptual truth, especially when 
dealing with philosophers who brought their own subjective cultivation 
and convictions to bear on shared historical-intellectual problems, and who 
were not as strict with terminology as they might have imagined. Instead, 
I will highlight conceptual affinities while also proposing the point where 
Simmel and Lukács parted company. This will begin with a discussion of 
Simmel’s doctrine of absolute relativism, as outlined in The Philosophy 
2 Feenberg: The Philosophy of Praxis; Kavoulakos: Lukács’s Philosophy of Praxis; Westerman: 
Lukács’s Phenomenology of Capitalism.
3 The most concise summary of this standpoint is to be found in Rose: From Speculative to 
Dialectical Thinking.
4 See Kavoulakos: What is Reification in Georg Lukács’s Early Marxist Work?
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of Money. Following a short evaluation of Lukács’s explicit, quite critical 
comments about Simmel, it will be demonstrated that a highly Simmelian 
problematic – namely, the opposition between absolute and relative truth – 
deeply informs Lukács’s famous essay, The Antinomies of Bourgeois Thought.
Lukács rejected relativism, which ultimately reduces logic to aesthetics 
and renders the movement of history as a succession of incomparable yet 
qualitatively distinct value-paradigms. But he equally rejected absolute ide-
alism, which he claimed erects a schematic logical-conceptual whole that is 
necessarily divorced from history and is, therefore, ultimately meaningless 
and still. As I have argued elsewhere, Lukács overcame these antinomies 
with a philosophically informed and politically radical concept of praxis that 
was supposed to unite logic (a dialectically-ordered conceptual totality) and 
genesis (the conceptual movement of history).5 The proletariat, its party and 
the workers’ state were the bearers of this concept of praxis – and Lukács 
hoped that their self-conscious, practical and transformative intervention 
into history would, for the first time, create a society in which new contents 
could be grasped by a democratic, collective consciousness by virtue of its 
ongoing de-reification of the forms of social objectivity. This is to say, while 
Lukács wished to preserve the truth-claims of Hegel’s absolute, he wished to 
divest them of their philosophical form and invest them instead in a collective 
revolutionary agency. This was the key to his overcoming of the contem-
plative, Kantian structure of bourgeois thought – Simmel included – with a 
de-sublimated, Marxist version of Hegel’s absolute knowing.
Ethically speaking, Lukács’s philosophy of praxis sought to chart a 
path between the reified, individualised »contemplative stance«6 endemic 
to bourgeois society, and a way of life through which the individual might 
reconcile with the universal, without being obliterated by it or subsuming it 
under their particularity. That is, Lukács sought a polity that could sustain 
reconciliation between subject and object. As I have argued, his solution 
broke down, revealing itself to be a conceptual mythology.7 This, paradox-
ically, pushes Lukács’s philosophy – albeit unknowingly – back to a tragic, 
theological standpoint he had already encountered in Soul and Form. This 
was equally an intellectual stance and style of life analysed by Simmel, 
described in The Philosophy of Money as the »sanguine enthusiast«8 and 
5 López: Lukács. The Antinomies of Bourgeois Philosophy.
6 Lukács: History and Class Consciousness, p. 89 (»contemplative Haltung«, Geschichte und Klas-
senbewußtsein, pp. 264).
7 See López: Lukács. Praxis and the Absolute, Ch. 9.
8 Simmel: The Philosophy of Money, p. 275 (»sanguinischer Enthusiast«, Philosophie des Geldes, 
p. 264).
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in his essay The Conflict of Modern Culture, in more radical form, as the 
»ascetic saint«.9 As Lukács knew well, the essentially romantic disposition 
underlying the sanguine enthusiast and the ascetic saint denotes a form of 
the contemplative stance which obliterates the object under messianically 
overextended subjectivity. For this reason, it makes impossible any true 
interrelation between means and ends or between self and other, rendering 
the goal of ethical action tragic. This, in turn, posits truth dualistically: on 
the one hand as an inaccessible, transcendent whole that is unknowable, 
and on the other, as an irrational, aesthetic and ultimately faith-driven 
subjective conviction. An estranged ›ought‹ always betrays what ›is‹. While 
Lukács himself escaped the cul-de-sac in which his 1920s philosophy 
found itself by way of a turn to orthodoxy in the 1930s, this accusation – if 
upheld – implicates his philosophy of praxis in a fatal ethical and logical 
self-contradiction. This also, I believe, demonstrates the immanent limit 
of all praxis-oriented Marxism.
However, rather than repeating this critique of Lukács, this chapter 
will instead propose a Simmelian alternative to the antinomic structure of 
Lukács’s philosophy of praxis. While groundwork exists in Simmel’s earlier 
writings, this will be drawn primarily from his final work, The View of Life, 
in which he proposes to overcome the bifurcated modern standpoint with a 
philosophy of life. It will be suggested that this solution has a broadly spec-
ulative (in the Hegelian sense) structure as it overcomes the dualisms of life 
not by predicting (or agitating for) a new form of life that may restore the 
fragmentary to wholeness. Rather, Simmel proposes a sphere of self-reflective 
knowledge – philosophy – that can provide a vantagepoint from which to 
traverse, analyse and reconcile the antinomies of modern life and thought. 
As a philosophical vantagepoint, the speculative standpoint is contemplative 
and individual – but this certainly does not forbid the speculative philoso-
pher from intervention into the world of from joining and shaping collective 
projects, should that be her or his proclivity. What this standpoint does 
promise, however, is practice of knowing whereby we may learn to traverse 
what Bloch evocatively called »das Dunkel des gelebten Augenblicks«.10 In 
more Hegelian terminology, this figure of thought has grasped the finitude 
and non-being of every being, both real and conceptual, and has understood 
that the passing over of every discreet thing into another is its negation and 
equally the movement of the true infinite. As Hegel writes:
9 Simmel: The Conflict of Modern Culture, p. 64.
10 See Bloch’s review of Lukács’ Actuality and Utopia, printed in Moir: The Archimedean Point, p. 
22.
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[T]he truth of the finite is rather its ideality. […] This ideality of the finite is the chief 
proposition of philosophy, and every true philosophy is for that reason idealism. The 
only thing that matters is not to take as the infinite what is at once made into something 
particular and finite in the determination of it.11
For a Lukácsian philosopher of praxis to inhabit this standpoint, they must 
divest praxis of the burden of absolute knowledge and instead cultivate 
the philosophical practice of absolute knowing. This may liberate praxis, 
as well as the philosopher, from a subjectively overdetermined, antinomic 
and ultimately tragic irrationalism which transforms praxis into an ought, 
or, an infinitely distant truth towards which we dutifully strive. If the acting 
consciousness – the philosopher of praxis – can forgive and accept forgive-
ness from the judging consciousness – the speculative philosopher – there 
a self-reflexive spiritual knowledge may appear, namely, speculative Marx-
ism.12 In conclusion, I will propose a few further consequences that follow 
for Lukácsian Marxism, and for Marxist philosophy in general, should this 
speculative, Simmelian proposal hold.
2. Simmel’s Absolute Relativism
From the references to Simmel in History and Class Consciousness, it seems 
clear that Lukács regarded The Philosophy of Money as the definitive state-
ment of Simmel’s philosophy. This is also where Simmel outlines his most 
comprehensive account of absolute relativism, his own philosophical po-
sition, at least prior to ›Lebensanschauung‹.13 Methodologically, The Phi-
losophy of Money combines philosophy and aesthetics. As Simmel explains 
in the 1907 Preface, philosophy, is more fundamental than the particular 
sciences because it moves fluidly from concepts to the »totality of life«.14 
This movement between the abstract and the concrete suits money, a unique 
social object that universally equates qualitative values. Simmel explained 
the role of aesthetics in his methodology, noting that the
great advantage of art over philosophy is that it sets itself a single, narrowly defined 
problem every time: a person, a landscape, a mood. Every extension of one of these to 
11 Hegel: Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline, Part I: Science of Logic, §. 95.
12 Gillian Rose called first for a speculative Marxism. This chapter seeks to contribute to that 
project. See Rose: Hegel Contra Sociology, pp. 223–226.
13 This should not be taken to imply that Simmel’s position prior to ›Lebensanschauung‹ is 
unchanging or that other works, for example, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, do not add important 
details to the picture.
14 Simmel: The Philosophy of Money, p. 53 (»Totalität des Lebens«, Philosophie des Geldes, p. VIII).
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the general, every addition of bold touches of feeling for the world is made to appear as 
an enrichment, a gift, an undeserved benefit.15
This is how Simmel justifies his decision to nominate money as an ideal 
structure, or a heuristic, with which to illuminate the whole. Philosophy 
holds the implicit arbitrariness of his heuristic at bay with the infinite rec-
iprocity of reasonable scrutiny. The result is a conceptual genesis of mon-
ey.16 As an aside, this is worth noting given the centrality Lukács accords 
to conceptual genesis, as the historical dimension of dialectical thought.17
Subsequently, in the first, analytic, section, Simmel builds an ideal an-
thropology of value in order to elucidate its subsequent genesis, eventually 
objectified in money. Initially, value is a spatial relation between people and 
things that is not reducible to either pole. Without people, no object is valuable 
and the value something holds for one person is only a part, at best, of its full 
value. In addition to this, value has a temporal dimension: To value something, 
we imagine a future in which the valued object is possessed and enjoyed.18 Yet 
as the object of desire is obtained and consumed, the future becomes the past 
and new desires are born, giving rise to new acts of valuation. So, while value 
cannot be extricated from these poles, between subjects and object or past and 
future, it is a »third term, an ideal concept which enters into the duality but 
is not exhausted by it«.19 Value is born in and helps us to define this tension, 
and this is what gives value a metaphysical or ideal quality.
Exchange is the practice that creates value: »By being exchanged, each 
object acquires a practical realization and measure of its value through the 
other object.«20 This holds even when an exchange seems gratuitously un-
equal. Nevertheless, as acts of exchange proliferate, the objective standards 
they produce are embodied in standardized values and eventually, money, 
which represents value in a formally universal manner, that is, numerically. 
Indeed, as Simmel argues, »money is the reification of exchange among peo-
15 Ibid., pp. 55–56 (»Der ungeheure Vorteil der Kunst gegenüber der Philosophie ist, daß sie sich 
jedesmal ein einzelnes, engumschriebenes Problem setzt; einen Menschen, eine Landschaft, 
eine Stimmung – und nun jede Erweiterung desselben zum Allgemeinen, jede Hinzufügung 
großer Züge des Weltfühlens, wie eine Bereicherung, Geschenk, gleichsam wie eine unverdiente 
Beglückung empfinden läßt.«, Philosophie des Geldes, p. VIII).
16 Ibid., p. 54 (Philosophie des Geldes, p. VII).
17 Cf Lukács: History and Class Consciousness, p. 141. For a further discussion of Lukács’s concept 
of genesis, see López: Lukács. The Antinomies of Bourgeois Philosophy.
18 Simmel: The Philosophy of Money, p. 74 (Philosophie des Geldes, p. 19).
19 Ibid., p. 70 (»[…] sie ist vielmehr ein Drittes, Ideelles, das zwar in jene Zweiheit eingeht, aber 
nicht in ihr aufgeht.«, Philosophie des Geldes, p. 14).
20 Ibid., p. 81 (»Denn indem sie gegeneinander ausgetauscht werden, gewinnt jeder die praktische 
Verwirklichung und das Maß seines Wertes an dem anderen.«, Philosophie des Geldes, p. 28).
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ple, and the embodiment of pure function«.21 Of course, many other social 
practices separate themselves from their human origins: communication, 
for instance, is objectified in language. But money is special because of its 
indifference. While language is tied with cultures and nations, money is a 
uniquely abstract universal mediator.
Although he identifies exchange as a fundamental human capacity, 
Simmel is careful to avoid making exhaustive claims about human nature. 
Because he sees money (and underlying it, exchange) as ultimately founded 
on a subjective valuation made between people, there is no need to defend an 
ontological substrate from which they derive their objectivity or to see them 
as expressions of an inner essence, like labour.22 Insofar as an epistemological 
standpoint is needed, Simmel’s approach gives ontological primacy to the 
present: Because modernity has perfected money, it is possible to posit a 
trans-historical anthropology of exchange while also using it to illuminate 
modern culture, as Simmel does in essays like Metropolis and Mental Life or 
The Adventurer.23 His is also a historicist approach. As a monetary societies 
extend the »teleological chain« – the distance between means and ends – by 
way of long trade networks, credit and other mechanisms, money transforms 
the way we perceive time on a grand scale, giving us an enhanced ability to 
plan, trade, to save and to invest.24 This extends our capacity to represent 
the past and the future in non-mythological or non-theological terms.25 This 
is also a perfect example of Simmel’s metacritical sociological method: His 
chosen heuristic makes it possible to historically relativise the immediacy 
of the prevalent forms of social objectivity.
Simmel did not glorify the monetary economy; many of his comments 
are redolent of Lukács’s own, humanistic critique of the fragmenting logic 
of reification.26 He did, however, prefer to avoid explicit politically in-
terventionist diagnoses. Philosophically, Simmel’s approach fit with the 
fashion of German neo-Kantian academia which, having been burned by 
the 19th-century quest for first premises, instead declined to inquire as to 
their epistemological foundations or the truth of the whole.27 Nevertheless, 
21 Ibid., p. 185 (»Die Doppelnatur des Geldes […] gründet sich darauf, daß es nur in der Hyposta-
sierung, gleichsam in der Fleischwerdung einer reinen Funktion, des Tausches unter Menschen, 
besteht.«, Philosophie des Geldes, p. 162).
22 For this reason, Simmel rejects the Marxian labour theory of value (ibid., pp. 444–445).
23 Simmel: Metropolis and Mental Life, pp. 174–185; Simmel: The Adventurer, pp. 190–197.
24 Simmel: The Philosophy of Money, p. 223 (Philosophie des Geldes, p. 202).
25 Ibid., p. 227 (Philosophie des Geldes, p. 206).
26 Ibid., p. 249.
27 Ibid., p. 108.
López: Lukács and Simmel ZGB 29/2020, 79–102
86
his defence of absolute relativism speaks to a growing crisis of meaning. 
Not content with limiting himself to partial inquiries, he is notable among 
his generation of anti-positivist sociologists both for his attention to the 
absolute, as a figure of thought, and his effort to ground his philosophical 
account in social theory and history. While freely admitting the ultimate 
baselessness of his philosophy of money, Simmel observed that even partial 
and modest truths presuppose greater and more essential truths. For even a 
limited statement to be true, it must rely on an infinite series of dependent 
assumptions and statements. And yet, if one truth is discovered to be false, 
the critical reason that proved the point sticks around afterwards, presup-
posing itself to be true, albeit negatively.
This metaphor resembles the economy: A totality of true statements is 
truer than one, in the same way as an economy is greater than the sum of the 
transactions that create it. Or, alternately, if one currency collapses, exchange 
as such is not implicated – and so, if critique is the last truth standing once 
all others have collapsed, it implies that critique is the ultimate, contentless 
truth. Thus, we are given two apparent dead ends: the elusive foundation of 
truth, on the one hand, and the unknowable totality of truth on the other. 
To begin with the latter, while we might posit that the totality of truths is 
superior to separate truths, this totality is unknowable: To render it as a 
mathematical whole, the sum total of extant truths, renders it as static and 
dooms it to supersession. The search for foundations, on the other hand, is 
too quick – every new candidate is superseded quickly by the newest, least 
dogmatic concept on the intellectual market. Philosophically speaking, the 
first path leads to dogmatism and the second to relativism. Both, however, 
regard »truth [as] a relative concept like weight«.28 Neither can escape the 
nihilistic conclusion that every truth is untrue.
Simmel also rejected pragmatic solutions to this dilemma, which pro-
pose that instead of searching for true answers, we should search for useful 
ones. After all, usefulness must be measured against some other ends. For 
example, to assess claims in terms of what is useful for life assumes the 
necessity of life. But as Simmel notes the »existence of real life is not neces-
sary in terms of any law; it would not contradict any logical or natural law 
if nothing existed«.29 Instead, Simmel proposed his own method – namely, 
positing heuristics that are admitted to contain an element of falsehood but 
28 Ibid., p. 111 (»[…] wie die Materienmassen es vermöge der Schwere tun; gleich dieser ist die 
Wahrheit dann ein Verhältnisbegriff«, Philosophie des Geldes, p. 68).
29 Ibid., p. 116 (»Daß überhaupt eine Wirklichkeit da ist, wird durch kein Gesetz notwendig 
gemacht, keinem logischen oder Naturgesetze wäre widersprochen, wenn es überhaupt kein 
Dasein gäbe.«, Philosophie des Geldes, p. 73).
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that facilitate the growth of knowledge through different successive (and 
potentially simultaneous) investigations.
This strategy has advantages. For one, it allows for paradigm shifts. 
Similarly, a moment of certainty (required in order to establish a new 
heuristic) is permitted critically, thereby guarding against dogmatism. 
Foundational assumptions are allowed domicile insofar as they pay rent 
by delivering knowledge. Still, relativism »shows that it is vain to consider 
any one of these viewpoints as definitive«; every certainty will eventually 
be evicted from the house of science.30 His conclusion is that »truth is valid, 
not in spite of its relativity but precisely on account of it«.31 Thus, the goal 
of truth transforms into the process of inquiring after truth – and whether 
one is satisfied with this no longer depends on an external standard, but 
whether one can be reconciled with the impermanence of truth. At least, 
Simmel consoled himself, this cultivates an openness to the extremes of 
life: »Then again it seems more admirable, and indeed the very challenge 
of life, to experience joy and sorrow, strength and weakness, virtue and sin 
as a living unity, each one being a condition of the other, each sacred and 
consecrating the other.«32 Yet the question is raised: Why seek the truth if 
it is infinitely distant? The tragedy of Simmel’s philosophy, in these years, 
was that he made the mind the object of its own inquiry, realising that the 
individual’s quest for truth would inevitably fail, revealing itself to be as 
perniciously circular as the movement of objective truth.33 In the 1910s, 
Simmel found no way out of this ever-expanding circle of finite knowledge.
3. Lukács’s Marxian Metacritique of Simmel
The particulars of Lukács’s relationship with Simmel are fairly well known. 
During the 1910s, Lukács attended Simmel’s lectures in Berlin and formed an 
intellectual friendship with him, internalising his outlook to a large extent. 
The elder Lukács described his manuscript on the Entwicklungsgeschichte 
des modernen Dramas as espousing a »truly […] Simmelian philosophy«.34 
30 Ibid., p. 118 (»Die Geschichte des Denkens zeigt es als vergeblich, einen dieser Standpunkte als 
den definitiven gewinnen zu wollen […]«, Philosophie des Geldes, p. 74).
31 Ibid., p. 123 (»Dort gilt die Wahrheit, trotzdem sie relativ ist, hier gerade, weil sie es ist.«, Phi-
losophie des Geldes, p. 82).
32 Ibid. (»Und dann wieder erscheint es einem als die Größe, ja die eigentliche Aufgabe, Lust und Leid, 
Kraft und Schwäche, Tugend und Sünde als  e i n e  Lebenseinheit zu fühlen, eines die Bedingung 
des anderen, jedes weihend und geweiht.«, Philosophie des Geldes, p. 75, Hervorhebung D. A. L.).
33 Ibid., p. 125.
34 Lukács: Selected Correspondence, 1902–1920, p. 14.
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Simmel himself seemingly corroborated this assessment in a 1909 letter, in 
which he enthusiastically endorsed Lukács’s methodology, despite politely 
declining to critically review the manuscript.35 Indeed, Lukács’s essays in Soul 
and Form grapple further with the distinctly Simmelian tension between 
form and life, albeit in a far more personal and immersive fashion that es-
chewed Simmel’s urbane, sociological value neutrality.36 At the same time, 
however, as early as 1906, Lukács expressed private hesitations about what 
he experienced as the »weightless and sterile« atmosphere he encountered 
in Simmel’s milieu.37 Simmel’s support for the First World War placed fur-
ther distance between him and Lukács. Given the latter’s ethically charged 
decision to join the Hungarian Communist Party in 1918, as well as the 
ethical concerns of Lukács’s early Marxist writing, it is doubtless that he 
felt a duty to explain the connection between Simmel’s conservative stance 
and his philosophical outlook. As Löwy recounts, as Lukács grasped the 
»imperialist nature of the war«, he renewed his interest in Marx, seen this 
time through »Hegelian rather than Simmelian spectacles«.38
Thus in his 1918 obituary of Simmel, Lukács described him as the phi-
losopher of impressionism and as possessing a »methodological pluralism« 
that while »holding firm to the absoluteness of every [categorical] positing«, 
was hostile to any point of view that would »embrace the totality of life«.39 
These critical comments are extended in History and Class Consciousness, 
where Lukács accuses Simmel of having produced an intellectually reified 
view of capitalist social relations, granting agency and power to bourgeois 
forms of objectivity and thus debarring the possibility of a praxis that may 
reshape the world consciously. This, he asserts, condemns Simmel to go no 
»further than a description«, with the consequence that his »›deepening‹ 
of the problem runs in circles around the eternal manifestations of reifi-
cation«.40 Later in the book, Lukács argues that this traps Simmel within 
antinomies that cannot be overcome, but only wrenched further apart, 
thus debarring him from grasping the key mediation that might overcome 
reification (the praxis of the proletariat) and effectively abolishing history.
35 Ibid., p. 93.
36 Lukács: Die Seele und die Formen; Yoon Sun Lee has explored the persistence of the Simmelian 
antinomy between form and life, as it occurs throughout Lukács’s whole career. See Sun Lee: 
Temporalized Invariance.
37 Gluck: Georg Lukács and his Generation, p. 147.
38 Löwy: Georg Lukács, p. 123.
39 Lukács: Georg Simmel, pp. 146–148.
40 Lukács: History and Class Consciousness, p. 95 (»Sie kommen aber damit über die bloße Beschrei-
bung nicht hinaus und ihre ›Vertiefung‹ des Problems dreht sich im Kreise um die äußerliche 
Erscheinungsformen der Verdinglichung.«, Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsen, p. 270). 
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And even if this antinomy [between subject and object] assumes increasingly refined forms 
in later times so that it even makes its appearance in the shape of historicism, of historical 
relativism, this does not affect the basic problem, the abolition of history, in the slightest.41
I have discussed the debt that Lukács’s concept of reification owes to Simmel 
elsewhere.42 Rather, what I wish to point out here is that the dialectical-his-
torical progression of concepts that Lukács discerns in classical German 
Idealism, in the section of History and Class Consciousness’s central essay 
entitled The Antinomies of Bourgeois Thought, grapples with precisely the 
same problematic that concerned Simmel in the sections of The Philosophy 
of Money summarised above. As I have undertaken a critical reading of this 
material elsewhere, I absolve myself of the necessity to reconstruct this re-
markable essay once more.43 What matters, however, are the key conceptual 
transformations that Lukács identifies, what they share with Simmel and where 
they diverge. Firstly, Lukács proposes that German Idealism began with the 
founding conviction that we have made the objective world and consequently, 
that it may be known rationally, in its totality.44 This is a grander claim than 
Simmel’s more modest conceptual genesis. Still, Simmel does posit an orig-
inary social practice – exchange – from which value emerges. It is simply 
more modest and self-critical. Lukács explains this difference in historical 
terms, proposing that classical German Idealism emerged in the twilight 
of the bourgeoisie’s heroic age. Consequently, it had not given up on the 
universalism of reason, unlike the more cynical or demoralised neo-Kantian 
philosophers with whom Lukács had broken, Simmel included.
The antinomies that Simmel outlines in his account of relativism, Lukács 
identifies via Kant. He argues that the demand to universalise reason drives 
towards two contradictory extremes: the whole (or the totality), which con-
cerns the ultimate objects of knowledge and the part (the thing in itself), 
which constitutes the ground of knowledge.45 A little later, he reframes this 
problem as the tension between the form of reason and its irrational con-
tents. Like Lukács, Simmel, as we have seen, declined to hypostatise either 
side, refusing to attribute truth to either a formal, mathematical totality or 
to abandon the question of truth by delimiting a partial sphere of rationality 
41 Ibid., pp. 156–157 (»Und wenn diese Antinomie auch in späteren Zeiten immer verfeinertere 
Formen annimmt, ja sogar als Historismus, als historischer Relativismus auftritt, so ändert dies 
an dem Grundproblem selbst, an der Aufhebung der Geschichte gar nichts.«, Geschichte und 
Klassenbewußtsein, p. 340).
42 López: Lukács: Praxis and the Absolute, Chs. 1 and 2.
43 See ibid., Ch. 8, and López: Lukács. The Antinomies of Bourgeois Philosophy.
44 Lukács: History and Class Consciousness, p. 112 (Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein, p. 288).
45 Ibid., p. 115 (Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein, p. 291).
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from its irrational substratum. Lukács overcomes this impasse by turning 
to Fichte who, in his account, radicalised practical reason, nominating the 
originary ethical act of the ego as constitutive of objectivity.46 Simmel, too, 
considered this Fichtean approach. He wrote:
And finally, to take a more comprehensive view: modern idealism produces the world 
from the Ego. The mind creates the world – the only world that we can discuss and that is 
real for us – according to its receptivity and its ability to construct forms. But on the other 
hand, this world is also the original source of the mind. […] Considered historically, the 
mind with all its form and contents is a product of the world – of the same world which 
is in turn a product of the mind because it is a world of representations.47
Lukács would have agreed with Simmel when the latter said that if 
»these two genetic possibilities are rigidly conceptualized they result in a 
disturbing contradiction«.48
However, the two begin to diverge in the way they overcome this dilem-
ma. Lukács, having derived a principle of creative human activity by way 
of Schiller, turns ultimately to Hegel, who elevated the basic antinomy in 
question to what Lukács regards as its highest philosophical expression, the 
opposition between ›genesis‹ and ›logic‹.49 In this formulation, genesis takes 
a different meaning to that which Simmel accords it: In Lukács’s Hegelian 
account, genesis denotes the conceptuality of history as it moves rationally, 
albeit in estrangement from its human origins. Logic refers to an ordered 
and dialectical conceptual totality, in which terms are dynamized and 
deeply interrelated.50 The dynamization of logical categories strains towards 
history, while the inner rationality of history strains towards logic. Yet, the 
contradiction between these two terms threatens to ruin both sides. With-
out dialectical logic, the genesis of history cannot be understood rationally, 
thus leaving us with a historical relativism that abolishes history in the flux 
of qualitatively distinct but irrational contents. And without grasping the 
historical genesis of the present, dialectical logic freezes over and becomes 
46 Ibid., pp. 123–124 (Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein, pp. 301–302).
47 Simmel: The Philosophy of Money, p. 119 (»Und endlich, noch weiter ausgreifend: der neuzeit-
liche Idealismus leitet die Welt aus dem Ich ab, die Seele erschafft, gemäß ihren Rezeptivitäten 
und produktiven Formungskräften die Welt, die einzige, von der wir sprechen können und die 
für uns real ist. Andrerseits aber ist diese Welt doch der Ursprung der Seele. […] Wenn wir 
historisch denken, so ist die Seele, mit all ihren Formen und Inhalten, ein Produkt der Welt 
– eben dieser Welt, die doch, weil sie eine vorgestellte ist, zugleich ein Produkt der Seele ist.«, 
Philosophie des Geldes, p. 77).
48 Ibid.
49 The famous final chapter of Die Phenomenologie des Geistes on Absolute Knowledge vindicates 
Lukács’s interpretation of the centrality of these terms in Hegelian philosophy. See Hegel: Die 
Phenomenologie des Geistes, §§. 804–808.
50 López: Lukács. The Antinomies of Bourgeois Philosophy, pp. 121–124.
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schematic. So, Lukács famously nominated the praxis of the proletariat as 
the mediation between these two philosophical opposites, as the real-world 
principle whereby the opposition between the absolute and the relative 
could be overcome for good. Simmel’s strategy is markedly more modest. 
He asserts that the »disturbing contradiction« between ego and world can 
be avoided »if they are regarded as heuristic principles which stand in a 
relationship of alteration and interaction«.51 Lukács, to the contrary, in his 
critique of Schiller, firmly rejected the aesthetic foundation upon which 
all heuristic devices, including Simmel’s, rested. He argued that any phi-
losophy with aesthetics at its base either risks aestheticizing the world (and 
annihilating action) or mythologising creation, and thus conceding fatally 
to irrationalism.52 Given the extent to which Lukács, in his pre-Marxist 
years, had internalised Simmel’s methodology which, it seems clear that 
this position represents a break with his former teacher.
In The Philosophy of Money, Simmel does not defend an uncritical 
relativism: rather, his is an absolute relativism. He gives the relative its due, 
proposing that truth emerges in the relationship between representations 
that can only be realised as an infinite construction whose conclusion can 
never be known.53 In specifying the absolute truth as a whole that cannot 
be known, he effects a transition between the relative and the absolute – by 
way of a passing mention of Spinoza:
[O]nly through the continuous dissolution of any rigid separateness into interaction do 
we approach the functional unity of all elements of the universe, in which the significance 
of each element affects everything else. Consequently, relativism is closer than one is 
inclined to think to its extreme opposite – Spinoza’s philosophy – with its all-embracing 
substantia sive Deus. This absolute, which has no other content than the universal concept 
of being, includes in its unity everything that exists. All particular continuities and sub-
stantialities, all second-order absolutes, are so completely merged in that single absolute 
that one might say: all the contents of the world view have become relatives in a monism 
such as Spinoza’s. The all-embracing substance, the only absolute that remains, can now 
be disregarded without thereby affecting the content of reality – the expropriator will now 
be expropriated, as Marx says of a process that is similar in form – and nothing remains 
but the relativistic dissolution of things into relations and processes.54
51 Simmel: The Philosophy of Money, p. 119 (»beängstigenden Widerspruch. […] wenn jede als 
ein heuristisches Prinzip gilt, das mit der anderen in dem Verhältnis von Wechselwirkung und 
gegenseitigem Sich-Ablösen steht«, Philosophie des Geldes, p. 77).
52 Lukács: History and Class Consciousness, pp. 139–140 (Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein, pp. 
319–320).
53 Simmel: The Philosophy of Money, p. 119 (Philosophie des Geldes, p. 71).
54 Ibid., pp. 125–126 (»Eher liegt es in Wirklichkeit umgekehrt: durch die ins Unendliche hin fort-
gesetzte Auflösung jedes starren Fürsichseins in Wechselwirkungen nähern wir uns überhaupt 
erst jener funktionellen Einheit aller Weltelemente, in der die Bedeutsamkeit eines jeden auf 
jedes andere überstrahlt. Darum steht der Relativismus auch seinem extremen Gegensatz, dem 
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Strictly speaking, then, Simmel defends a conception of the absolute as an 
unknowable nothing that is posited by the infinite reciprocity of reason, as it 
works through various contents. And on this basis, he believes it possible to 
cast it aside, or perhaps, to leave it as an object of mystical contemplation.
This does not please Lukács. In words redolent of his critique of Sim-
mel, noted above, he suggests that all relativism conceals the »the dogmatic 
position of those thinkers who likewise offered to explain the world from 
premises they did not consciously acknowledge and which, therefore, they 
adopted uncritically«. Lukács then argues:
For, from the standpoint of both logic and method, the ›systematic location‹ of the abso-
lute is to be found just where the apparent [conceptual] movement stops. The absolute is 
nothing but the fixation of thought, it is the projection into myth of the intellectual failure 
to understand reality concretely as a historical process. […] And as long as the absolute 
survives in a system (even unconsciously) it will prove logically stronger than all attempts 
at relativism. For it represents the highest principle of thought attainable in an undialectical 
universe, in a world of ossified things and a logical world of ossified concepts. What these 
relativists are doing is to take the present philosophy of man with its social and historical 
limits and to allow these to ossify into an ›eternal‹ limit […] Actuated either by doubt or 
despair they thus stand revealed as a decadent version of the very rationalism or religios-
ity they mean to oppose. Hence they may sometimes be a not unimportant symptom of 
the inner weakness of the society which produced the rationalism they are ›combating‹. 
But they are significant only as symptoms. It is always the culture they assail, the culture 
of the class that has not yet been broken, that embodies the authentic spiritual values.55
Spinozismus mit seiner allumfassenden substantia sive Deus, näher als man glauben möchte. 
Dieses Absolute, das keinen anderen Inhalt hat als den Allgemeinbegriff des Seins überhaupt, 
schließt demnach in seine Einheit alles ein, was überhaupt ist. Die einzelnen Dinge können nun 
allerdings kein Sein für sich mehr haben, wenn alles Sein seiner Realität nach schon in jene gött-
liche Substanz ebenso vereinheitlicht worden ist, wie es seinem abstrakten Begriff nach, eben als 
Seiendes überhaupt, eine Einheit bildet. Alle singulären Beständigkeiten und Substanzialitäten, 
alle Absolutheiten zweiter Ordnung sind nun so vollständig in jene eine aufgegangen, daß man 
direkt sagen kann: in einem Monismus, wie dem Spinozischen, sind die sämtlichen Inhalte des 
Weltbildes zu Relativitäten geworden. Die umfassende Substanz, das allein übrig gebliebene 
Absolute, kann nun, ohne daß die Wirklichkeiten inhaltlich alteriert würden, außer Betracht 
gesetzt werden – die Expropriateurin wird expropriiert, wie Marx einen formal gleichen Prozeß 
beschreibt – und es bleibt tatsächlich die relativistische Aufgelöstheit der Dinge in Beziehungen 
und Prozesse übrig.«, Philosophie des Geldes, pp. 84–85).
55 Lukács: History and Class Consciousness, pp. 187–188 (»Denn der Punkt, der dem Aufhören 
der Scheinbewegung in diesen Systemen logisch-methodisch entspricht, ist eben der ›systema-
tische Ort‹ des Absoluten. Das Absolute ist nichts anderes als die gedankliche Fixierung, die 
mythologisierend positive Wendung der Unfähigkeit des Denkens, die Wirklichkeit konkret 
als geschichtlichen Prozeß zu begreifen. […] Und solange das Absolute im System (wenn auch 
unbewußt) mitgedacht ist, muß es den Relativierungsversuchen gegenüber das logisch stärkere 
Prinzip bleiben. Denn es vertritt das höchste Denkprinzip, das auf undialektischem Boden, in 
der Seinswelt der starren Dinge und der logischen Welt der starren Begriffe erreichbar ist; […]. 
Denn diese Relativisten tun nichts anderes, als die gegenwärtige gesellschaftlich-geschichtlich 
gegebene Schranke der Weltauffassung des Menschen in die Form einer biologischen, pragma-
tistischen usw. ›ewigen‹ Schranke erstarren zu lassen. Auf diese Weise sind sie nichts mehr als 
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When presented alongside Simmel’s defence of absolute relativism, and with 
Lukács’s critique of Simmel’s culturally focused impressionism in mind, it 
seems clear that these lines were intended as much for Lukács’s former teach-
er as anyone. Even Lukács’s slip into moralising language – attributing rela-
tivism to doubt or despair and seeing it as a decadent, transitional product of 
culture in decline – brings to mind his early feelings of estrangement from 
Simmel’s milieu and from Central European intellectual culture generally. 
4. Simmel’s rejoinder
Being and becoming are the most general, formal, and inclusive formulations of the basic 
dualism that patterns all human beings: all great philosophy is engaged in founding a 
new reconciliation between them, or a new way of giving decisive primacy to one over 
the other.56
Lukács’s philosophy culminated with praxis. This he understood in political 
terms, as the unity between the theory and practice of the proletarian move-
ment, culminating in a decision, freely made by the proletariat (through 
the mediation of a revolutionary party and workers’ councils), to make an 
insurrection and to remake the world.57 This praxis, for Lukacs, was sup-
posed to overcome the unconscious, dead weight of the past – as embodied 
in reified institutions and social relations – as well as the reified future of 
utopianism, which projects the ethical structure of bourgeois society, in 
idealised form, into the future. Praxis was to do this by converging on the 
present – in the blink of an eye, as he described it in A Defence of History 
and Class Consciousness.58 And once there, praxis would knowingly create 
the new, finally uniting genesis with logic, in a process of continual medi-
ation undertaken by an emancipated humanity. As he wrote, in a moment 
of almost religious excess: 
eine sich in der Form von Zweifel, Verzweiflung usw. ausdrückende Dekadenzerscheinung jenes 
Rationalismus oder jener Religiosität, denen sie zweifelnd gegenüberstehen. Sie sind deshalb – 
zuweilen – ein geschichtlich nicht unwichtiges Symptom dafür, daß jenes gesellschaftliche Sein, 
auf dessen Boden der von ihnen ›bekämpfte‹ Rationalismus usw. entstand, bereits innerlich 
problematisch geworden ist. Sie sind aber nur als solche Symptome bedeutsam. Die wirklichen 
geistigen Werte hat ihnen gegenüber stets die von ihnen bekämpfte Kultur, die Kultur der noch 
ungebrochenen Klasse repräsentiert.«, Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein, p. 374, emphasis in 
the original).
56 Simmel: Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, pp. 176–177.
57 For more on Lukács’s philosophical discussion of Lenin’s revolutionary realpolitik, see López: 
Lukács: Praxis and the Absolute, Chs. 5–7.
58 Lukács: A Defence of History and Class Consciousness, p. 55.
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As long as man concentrates his interest contemplatively upon the past or future, both ossify 
into an alien existence. […] Man must be able to comprehend the present as a becoming. 
He can do this by seeing in it the tendencies out of whose dialectical opposition he can 
make the future. Only when he does this will the present be a process of becoming, that 
belongs to him. Only he who is willing and whose mission it is to create the future can 
see the present in its concrete truth.59
Simmel also wished to locate truth in the present. In The Philosophy of 
Money, he defended the present as the only basis for knowledge of the past: 
No matter how many transformations and quantitative changes are required, the present, 
which is the indispensable key to the past, can itself be understood only through the past; 
and the past, which alone can help us to understand the present, is accessible only through 
the perceptions and sensibilities of the present.60
Simmel’s present was, however, quite different from Lukács’s, notwithstand-
ing the fact that only five years intervened between the former’s death and 
the publication of History and Class Consciousness. Insofar as Simmel took 
an ›inward road‹ in order to resolve the antinomies he wrestled with, he did 
not discover it in the experience of reification endured by the proletariat in 
the work day, as Lukács did. Rather, Simmel encountered it via an analysis 
of the extremes of modern culture. In the essay The Conflict of Modern Cul-
ture, he diagnosed the ground of these antinomies as the tension between 
form and life:
What we are is, it is true, spontaneous life, with its equally spontaneous, unanalysable sense 
of being, vitality and purposiveness, but what we have is only its particular form at any one 
time, which, as I have stressed above, proves from the moment of its creation to be part of 
quite a different order of things. […] This paradox becomes more acute, more apparently 
insoluble, to the degree that the inner being which we can only call life tout court asserts 
its formless vitality, while at the same time inflexible, independent forms claim timeless 
legitimacy and invite us to accept them as the true meaning and value of our lives – that 
is the paradox is intensified, perhaps, to the degree to which culture progresses.61
59 Lukács: History and Class Consciousness, p. 204, emphasis in the original (»Solange der Mensch 
sein Interesse – anschauend kontemplativ – auf Vergangenheit oder Zukunft richtet, erstarren 
beide zu einem fremden Sein […]. Erst wenn der Mensch die Gegenwart als Werden zu er-
fassen fähig ist, indem er in ihr jene Tendenzen erkennt, aus deren dialektischem Gegensatz 
er die Zukunft zu schaffen fähig ist, wird die Gegenwart, die Gegenwart als Werden, zu seiner 
Gegenwart. Nur wer die Zukunft herbeizuführen berufen und gewillt ist, kann die konkrete 
Wahrheit der Gegenwart sehen.«, Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein, p. 392, emphasis in the 
original).
60 Simmel: The Philosophy of Money, p. 119 (»Wie viele Umbildungen und Quantitätsänderungen 
auch dazu erforderlich seien, jedenfalls ist die Gegenwart, die uns der unentbehrliche Schlüssel 
für die Vergangenheit ist, doch nur durch diese selbst verständlich, und die Vergangenheit, die 
allein uns die Gegenwart verstehen läßt, ohne die Anschauungen und Fühlbarkeiten eben dieser 
Gegenwart überhaupt nicht zugängig.«, Philosophie des Geldes, p. 76).
61 Simmel: The Conflict of Modern Culture, pp. 89–90 (»Wir sind zwar das Leben unmittelbar 
und damit ist ebenso unmittelbar ein nicht weiter beschreibliches Gefühl von Dasein, Kraft, 
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Prior to the First World War, and in its early years, Simmel did not discern 
an intellectual pathway out of the tension between form and life. He instead 
proposed two lifestyles or character types that radicalise either side of the 
antinomy. The ascetic saint radicalises an ideal of life, as whole and flour-
ishing, against a culture whose forms have hypertrophied to the point where 
they cannot sustain a meaningful life. The ascetic saint is thus a nihilistic 
revolutionary who takes aim at a culture as a whole in the name of a perfect, 
absolutely meaningful future. The opposite type is the specialist fanatic. 
Although quite aware of the sickness of their culture and its diminished 
ability to cultivate life, the specialist fanatic defends the cultural forms that 
sustain their own fragmented specialisation by designating a particular en-
emy. In so doing, the call for the regeneration of a specific national culture. 
This type thus idealises a previous golden age and promises that it will be 
reborn if the sickness of culture is purged.62
While the former type corresponds more closely to the left – and to 
Lukács – the latter corresponds to the right and is a prototype for reactionary 
or fascist irrationalism. Nevertheless, both types share a central contradic-
tion: Both locate the truth of culture and life in a transcendent future. Thus, 
they transform the present into a pernicious chasm of meaninglessness 
that must be bridged by violence: revolutionary violence, in the former 
and reactionary terror in the latter. Lukács’s philosophy of praxis falls into 
precisely the same chasm. Because the model for his concept of praxis was 
drawn from the Russian Revolution, he fetishized a moment of praxis that 
had already slipped away by 1923. Yet, the immediate purpose of History and 
Class Consciousness was political, namely, to arm the proletarian movement 
with a theory adequate to reviving this praxis in Western Europe. This relies 
on the promised return of revolutionary praxis. And yet, because Lukács 
would have the concept of praxis bear the weight of absolute knowing, the 
absence of praxis (or, more correctly, the incompleteness and blindness of 
praxis) in the present in fact imprisoned his philosophy of praxis in a nos-
talgic-messianic nihilism. This was a more radical nihilism than Simmel’s 
earlier absolute relativism, to be sure. However, it is also a more dogmatic 
Richtung verbunden; aber wir haben es nur an einer jeweiligen Form, die, wie ich schon betonte, 
im Augenblick ihres Auftretens sich einer ganz anderen Ordnung angehörig zeigt […]. Dieser 
Widerspruch wird krasser und scheint unversöhnlicher in dem Maße, in dem jene Innerlichkeit, 
die wir nur Leben schlechthin nennen können, sich in ihrer ungeformten Stärke geltend macht, 
in dem andererseits die Formen sich in ihrem starren Eigenbestand, ihrer Forderung unver-
jährbarer Rechte als der eigentliche Sinn oder Wert unserer Existenz anbieten, vielleicht also in 
dem Maße, in dem die Kultur gewachsen ist.«, Der Konflikt der modernen Kultur, pp. 45–46).
62 Simmel: The Concept and Tragedy of Culture, p. 64.
López: Lukács and Simmel ZGB 29/2020, 79–102
96
nihilism. By dismissing the absolute as constitutively not-knowable in 
The Philosophy of Money, Simmel authored what might be described as 
a philosophy of finitude: if the absolute is infinitely distant, all that is left 
is the self-negating movement of finite contents through themselves. In 
nominating money (or later, culture) as an ultimately aesthetic heuristic, 
Simmel acknowledged the incompleteness and ultimate groundlessness of 
his philosophy. Lukács, on the other hand, elevated one finite contents – 
the praxis of October 1917 – to the status of an infinite. In this manner, he 
tasked praxis with the overcoming of the antinomies of bourgeois thought 
and with the conscious creation of the new – heroic tasks, even for a trium-
phant socialist revolution. Yet this obscured the element of violence in the 
October Revolution and the decision of a sovereign, Lenin, that initiated 
it under a mythologisation of the consciousness of the proletariat. It may 
well be said that Lukács selected praxis for his heuristic. Yet, he did so on 
an absolute basis, and thus made of it a political theology: He erected a 
model of past praxis as an ›ought‹ over and against the situation he saw 
around him, in the 1920s. To be sure, he paid close attention to the concrete 
mediations of practical politics. Nevertheless, as Hegel argued, religion »is 
any elevation of the finite to the infinite, when the infinite is conceived as 
a definitive form of life«.63
The problem, then, is not with the contents of Lukács’s philosophy of 
praxis (namely, his specific views and philosophical, sociological or po-
litical concepts) but with its form. It is a philosophy in the Hegelian sense 
insofar as it has the absolute as its substance and insofar as it rejects finite, 
relative being as something ultimate and absolute. Yet because Lukács did 
not regard his philosophy of praxis philosophically, that is, because he saw 
philosophy as something to be overcome by the higher truth of political 
praxis, his did not reflect the philosophical form of his philosophy. He was 
trapped, then, in what Hegel called representative thought. And insofar as 
Lukács covertly fetishized a particular, finite contents, he did not carry the 
principle of philosophy to its conclusion. Thus, Hegel would have regarded 
his infinite as a spurious one:
It is only the spurious infinite which is the beyond, because it is only the negation of the 
finite posited as real – as such it is the abstract, first negation; determined only as negative, 
the affirmation of determinate being is lacking in it; the spurious infinite, held fast as 
only negative is even supposed to be not there, is supposed to be unattainable. However, 
to be thus unattainable is not its grandeur but its defect, which is at bottom the result of 
63 Hegel: Fragment of a System (1800), p. 317.
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holding fast to the finite as such as a merely affirmative being. It is what is untrue that is 
unattainable and such an infinite must be seen as a falsity.64
In The View of Life, Simmel overcame this problem.65 »Life as Transcend-
ence«, the first chapter, proposes a concept of life that can overcome the 
hypostatisation of the past and the future. Simmel identifies the ground for 
this movement as life itself, which exists in an absolute present:
As long as past, present, and future are separated with conceptual precision, time is unreal, 
because only the temporally unextended (i.e., the atemporal present) moment is real. But 
life is the unique mode of existence for whose actuality this separation do not hold […] 
Time is real only for life alone.66
Because time destroys all values, all values are transient and finite. And yet, 
the notion of an absolute present, partly informed by Nietzsche’s eternal 
return, allows us to recover the infinite quality of value: if past and future 
are grasped as polyvalent perspectives born of the present, values can be 
known as infinite. To posit the finitude of one set of values is simply to tear 
them down in favour of another; the passing away of the finite is equally 
the creation of the new.
By holding fast to qualities amidst their falling away, life also demon-
strates its power to establish and transcend all boundaries. Simmel means 
this in a simple sense, namely, that life needs separations and divisions: 
larger, smaller, behind, in front, here, there, food, not-food, safe, unsafe. 
Humans, however, possess an additional capacity to reflect on the bound-
aries we create. By even naming a boundary, we already concede that we 
are beyond it. So, for every finite measure we propose, we state in principle 
that we can exceed it, if only negatively. This, of course, is close to the po-
sition that Simmel expressed in The Philosophy of Money. Now, however, 
he goes one step further, stating that we »deny the boundary the moment 
we know its one-sidedness, without ceasing thereby to stand within it«.67 
The prize of this insight is the philosophical knowledge that the infinite is 
both external and our own possession and creation: it emerges within the 
movement through finite contents. Thus, our souls combine infinite and 
finite, becoming and being: »With every exertion of the will in the here and 
now, we demonstrate that a threshold between ›now‹ and the ›future‹ is just 
not real, and that as soon as we assume such a threshold, we stand at once 
64 Hegel: The Science of Logic, p. 149.
65 This is not to assert that Simmel became a late convert to Hegelian philosophy. To fully consider 
this possibility, a much more detailed, Hegelian reading of The View of Life would be necessary.
66 Simmel: The View of Life, p. 8.
67 Ibid., p. 5.
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on this side and on the other side of it.«68 So, Simmel overcame relativism 
by understanding that the power of negativity at its core is our power and 
a necessary precondition for everything valuable: »By virtue of our highest, 
self-transcending consciousness at any given moment, we are the absolute 
above our relativity.«69
This does not deny that acts of valuation, necessary for life, can freeze 
over and tyrannize life. Insofar as we do not recognize our own activity or 
thought in an act of valuation, it can become transcendent and metaphysical. 
And when objectified in external structures (say, the economy, academia, 
the Church, the state), practices which generate values become reified and 
blindly self-perpetuating. Yet the advantage of Simmel’s final perspective 
is not that it promises a final overcoming of all estrangement. Rather, his 
philosophy of life can sustain what is qualitative about each overarching 
value (say, beauty, truth, divinity, justice) without reducing them to each 
other – or worse, to indifference. In this manner, Simmel builds a conceptual 
universe that can sustain totalities of meaning, religious, aesthetic, technical, 
political, while allowing them to flourish concurrently, conflicting, coexist-
ing and cross-polinating, while resisting the impulse to collapse them into 
each other. While these worlds of meaning contribute to and draw from the 
absolute in their turn, insofar as they claim to exclusively possess or fully 
know the absolute, they produce a life-denying after-world and implicitly 
negate themselves.70 When this insight is applied to Lukács’s philosophy of 
praxis, it means that the concept of praxis – which promises a revaluation 
of political values – can be encountered in light of both its finitude and its 
ability to produce the new, that is, to evoke the infinite as it creates a future 
in the negation of the past – all in the blink of an eye. If this can be done 
without fetishizing praxis as a finitized infinite, then genuinely radically 
transformative political praxis may be possible. If this conceptual possibility 
became actual, it would signify the formation of a polity in which the acting 
and judging consciousness may forgive each other.
During and after the 1920s, Lukács condemned Simmel’s argument as 
an example of irrationalist ›Lebensphilosophie‹.71 Yet, Simmel’s viewpoint 
is capable of saving the ethical and anti-formalistic, de-reifying impulse of 
philosophy of praxis. Simmel writes:
68 Ibid., p. 17.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Cf. Lukács: The Destruction of Reason (Germ. Die Zerstörung der Vernunft).
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Everything varying, or by definition unique, or gliding in the continuity of life without 
assignable boundaries; everything that eludes any subordination under a preexisting 
law and likewise eludes conceptual sublimation to a universal law – all this now finds an 
Ought over it, because the latter itself is a life and retains its continuing form. And indeed 
because the demand does not confront life as a rigid once-and-for-all, everything we have 
ever done and everything we have ever been obligated to is the condition under which our 
ethical ideal life rises to the crest of what is currently obligated. Just as each pulse-beat of 
a living being is determined by all its past pulse-beats, likewise nothing can be lost in this 
process, which makes not only the act but also the Ought of every moment into the heir 
and the bearer of responsibility of all that we have ever been, done, and been obligated to. 
Thus is finally completed the differentiation – the freeing, so to speak – of the elements 
of whose amalgamation in Kant’s ethics these pages have so often spoken: that only the 
actual, but not the ideal-normative, can be individual, and only the universal, not the in-
dividual, can be lawful – these are the linkages whose undoing has been accomplished on 
this long path, so that the linkage of individuality and lawfulness could be accomplished.72
Philosophy of praxis erects an »Ought« over and against the present – and 
locates the truth of this ought in a past that is recollected. Yet, the recollec-
tion was that of an individual philosopher – Georg Lukács – whose political 
conviction was deeply subjective and profoundly ethical. And insofar as this 
was the case, he spoke not for a universal, but for an individual; specifically, 
an individual who lived under a self-imposed, non-actual ideal-normative 
concept. The desublimation of the concept of praxis – which was here ac-
complished by way of Simmel’s philosophy of life – dissolves its mythical 
from, revealing the individual articulation of the philosopher. In so doing, 
it prepares the individual to take responsibility for his actions and to live 
ethically without subsuming life under an ought and to participate in and 
contribute to a universal law. This was, in fact, the ultimate goal of Lukács’s 
philosophy of praxis.
5. Conclusion
A number of incidental observations flow from this argument. Firstly, if it is 
true that a speculative standpoint can be derived from Lukács and Simmel, 
and more broadly, by way of the antinomies of neo-Kantian fin de siècle 
philosophy, then Lukács’s pessimistic historicization of bourgeois philosophy 
is further undermined. This is not, of course, to say that all eras or cultures 
within modernity can generate speculative philosophy. But it does assert 
that philosophy did not come to an end with Hegel. From this it flows that 
Marx and Marxism did not put an end to or complete philosophy, effecting 
a turn towards historical, social or political knowledge in its place. Rather, 
72 Simmel: The View of Life, p. 154.
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philosophy is vouchsafed a continued role as a sphere of reflective knowl-
edge that may cultivate actors who can practice a thinking that reconciles 
between the antinomies that structure social being. Secondly, if indeed Sim-
mel developed a speculative standpoint, he did so without relying, at least 
in his published writing, extensively on Hegel’s own philosophical system. 
Indeed, his articulation of the speculative standpoint is quite distinct from 
Hegel’s: it is less systematising, less certain about the immanent logic of 
history and rather more expressionist. A full comparison of Simmel’s phi-
losophy of life with Hegel’s system would no doubt raise further differences 
– and likely contradictions. Yet, presuming that Simmel’s final position is 
indeed speculative (and, for that matter, presuming that Lukács’s position 
is implicitly speculative) then the particularities and achievements of their 
philosophies must represent a synthesis between their own, finite, human 
particularities and the historical period whose truth they both incompletely, 
yet profoundly, expressed. Absolute knowing, after all, is not synonymous 
with the absolute. It is the practice of philosophy and does not demand the 
repetition of the same form or contents, as though this were possible at all. 
Seen in this manner, a diversity of pathways into speculative thought and 
the possibility of different articulations of if enriches the cultural wealth 
of spirit while rewarding the successful philosopher with the joy of having 
produced something both universally true and irreducibly particular. To 
make a contribution like this is to win a kind of eternal life that flourishes 
not in an afterworld, but in the minds of living people: So long as we discern 
new insights in Lukács and Simmel’s work, their legacy will never lapse into 
flat self-identity, but will instead generate diversity within unity.
This implies a third observation, a hypothesis. In a culture that produces 
antinomic or dialectical thought, there are multiple pathways to a speculative 
standpoint. If true, it is good news indeed for Hegelians. No longer need it 
be their infinite duty to reconstruct the system of their teacher – unless, of 
course, that is what they desire. Rather, we can encounter and make the new. 
On a broader level, the more that the social totality is capable of generating 
speculative knowledge, the greater chance humanity has of knowing itself 
in its imperfection and finitude, and in so doing, approaching the true 
infinite. Finally, if it is possible to elevate Lukács’s thought to the status of 
philosophy proper, then a broader promise is issued for Marxism as a whole. 
In the aftermath of the failure of every one of its major currents, if Marx-
ism confesses to having idolised this or that finite contents, as a theoretical 
culture situated within modernity, the socialist movement may grasp the 
form of the true infinite and rise to philosophy proper, thus sustaining a 
freer, more rational and more radical praxis. So, Simmel’s final gift to Lukács 
101
ZGB 29/2020, 79–102 López: Lukács and Simmel
may well be a gift for Marxist philosophy as a whole: a contribution to the 
reformation of Marxism for which Gillian Rose called and a step towards 
founding a Marxian absolute idealism.
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